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Action

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Info

Control:

Rec'd:

10616

JUNE 15, 1959

10:25 A.M.

FROM: GENEVA

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CAHTO 112, JUNE 15, 2 PM

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NIACT

FOR ACTING SECRETARY FROM THE SECRETARY.

WE MEET WITH GROMYKO IN PRIVATE SESSION AT 5:30 THIS AFTERNOON AT COUVE'S VILLA AND WILL TELEPHONE MURPHY RESULTS. AT 3:15 VON BRENTANO, COUVE, LLOYD AND MYSELF ARE GETTING TOGETHER, SELWYN BEING DUE TO ARRIVE AT THREE FROM LONDON AFTER ATTENDANCE THIS MORNING'S CABINET MEETING.

THIS MORNING I CALLED ON COUVE WHO HAD RETURNED LAST EVENING FROM PARIS. HE IS SERENE AND AS I HAD EXPECTED CONFIRMED IN HIS TOUGH AND I THINK REALISTIC LINE BY HIS TALKS OVER THE WEEKEND WITH DEBRE AND DE GAULLE.

IN REVIEWING TOGETHER SITUATION AS IT NOW STANDS WE WERE AGREED LIKELIHOOD LLOYD WILL RETURN WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTINUE CONFERENCE IN INDEFATIGABLE EFFORT TO ASSURE SUMMIT MEETING THIS SUMMER. BOTH COUVE AND I ARE COMPLETELY SATISFIED THAT IF GROMYKO CONTINUES TO INSIST ON DISCUSSING HIS NEW PROPOSAL AND REFUSES IN EFFECT TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATING POSITION AS IT EXISTED LAST MONDAY THEN IT IS NOT ONLY FUTILE BUT PROBABLY PRODUCTIVE OF INCREASED TENSIONS TO CONTINUE THIS STERILE DIALOGUE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE BOTH FAVOR RECESSING THIS CONFERENCE UNTIL MID JULY. THIS HOWEVER WILL GO HARD WITH LLOYD AND MAY WELL BE REJECTED BY GROMYKO WHO HAS BEEN CONFIRMING OUR ESTIMATE THAT HE IS SEEKING TO DRIVE US TO A SUMMIT CONFERENCE BY THE CRISIS ROUTE RATHER THAN BY ANY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT HERE. BRITISH FASCINATION FOR A SUMMIT FOR SUMMIT'S SAKE OF COURSE PROBABLY CONTRIBUTES TO SOVIET BELIEF THAT THIS MANEUVER WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.

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CORRECTION ISSUED:
6/15/59, 2:30 PM JAL

-2-CAHTO 112, JUNE 15, 2 0. FROM GENEVA -CORRECTED PAGE TWO

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COUVE REPORTED THAT DE GAULLE REMAINS ABSOLUTELY ADAMANT ON UNWISDOM OF A SUMMIT CONFERENCE ON SUCH A BASIS. THIS, AS COUVE SAID, IS "MORE FOR REASONS OF PRUDENCE THAN PRESTIGE" SINCE AN UNSUCCESSFUL SUMMIT WOULD HAVE SUCH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. COUVE ADDED (AND PLEASE PROTECT HIM) THAT DE GAULLE HAD SAID THAT IF THERE WERE A SUMMIT MEETING UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES HE HIMSELF WOULD REFUSE TO GO EVEN IF PRESIDENT ATTENDED. COUVE AND I AGREED THAT THIS AFTERNOON AND IF NECESSARY TOMORROW WE WOULD RESOLUTELY SEEK TO RETURN GROMYKO TO DISCUSSION OF OUR OLD FIVE-POINT PAPER, POSSIBLY INDICATING ORALLY IF COURSE OF CONVERSATION SO WARRANTED THAT IN FIRST PARAGRAPH WE COULD ACCEPT CLEAR IMPLICIT TREATMENT OF OUR RIGHTS RATHER THAN EXPLICIT LANGUAGE.

WE TALKED A LITTLE OF INCOMPREHENSIBLE WEST GERMAN TIMIDITY OVER THOUGHT OF ANY DEALINGS WITH EAST GERMANS AND COUVE REMARKED THAT SUCH DEALINGS BOUND TO COME AND WOULD BE BETTER STARTED UNDER ADENAUER IF HE COULD BE PERSUADED THAN BY HIS SUCCESSOR.

I TOLD COUVE IN EXTREME CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT WAS GIVING SOME THOUGHT TO POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE TO KHRUSHCHEV TO BE DESPATCHED IN NEXT FEW DAYS. THIS SEEMED TO APPEAL TO HIM. I INDICATED THAT IF THIS WERE THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION I WOULD BE TALKING TO HIM AND LLOYD ABOUT IT.

INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH COUVE'S PARTING REMARK WAS THAT HE RATHER IMAGINED THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE PROCESS IN WHICH WE ARE ALL NOW ENGAGED WOULD BE A KHRUSHCHEV VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

HERTER

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